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l~ THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
~lORRIS L. PETERS, 
Plaintiff- Appellant, 
-vs-
\'IRGINIA S. PETERS, 
Defendant- Respondent. 
Case No. 10059 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a decision of the Hon-
orable Parley E. Norseth, Judge, Second Judicial District, 
\\' eber County, denying the appellant's complaint for di-
vorce from the respondent, granting the respondent a di-
vorce on her counterclaim, and awarding the respondent 
the sum of $2,500.00, lump sum in lieu of alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 28, 1963, the appellant filed a complaint for 
diYorce against the respondent in the District Court of 
\\'eber County (R-2). On the same day an order to show 
cause and temporary restraining order were also issued 
and served (R-3, 13, 14). On October 30, 1963, there-
spondent filed an .\nswer and Counterclaim ( R-4), a mo-
tion to \·acate the restraining order ( R-6) and an affidavit 
of prejudice (R-7). On November 1, 1963, the appellant 
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filed his reply to the respondent's counterclaim ( R-8). 
On November 4, 1963, the case was referred to Judge Nor-
seth's Court (R-9). Judge Norseth allowed the respondent 
to remain in the home with the appellant and set a special 
hearing on the merits for November 13, 1963 (R-10). On 
November 5, 1963, the respondent filed an "amended" 
Answer and Counterclaim (R-11). Trial was had on 13 
November, 1963 (R-14). On January 3, 1964, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree awarding respond-
ent a divorce and $2,500.00 lump sum in lieu of alimony was 
entered by the Court (R-21, 22). The Court also awarded 
the appellant real estate "now standing in the joint names 
of the parties" (R-22). On January 31, 1964, the ap-
pellant filed his notice and designation of record to this 
Court (R-31, 32). Thereafter, on February 5, 1964, after 
appeal of this case respondent petitioned the trial court for 
appeal costs, attorney's fees, and temporary alimony pend-
ing appeal (R-33). On February 19, 1964, Judge Norseth 
ordered $50.00 per month temporary alimony on appeal 
and $300.00 attorney's fees on appeal (R-39). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant asks the Court to reverse the trial court's 
decision granting the respondent a divorce on counterclaim 
and order the trial court to grant appellant a divorce as 
prayed, and additionally and in the alternative, that the 
court reverse the trial court's award of a lump sum in lieu of 
alimony. Further, appellant seeks an order vacating the 
trial court's awards of alimony and attorney's fees pending 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant and respondent were married on Novem-
ber 6, 1961 in Preston, Idaho (T-6). At the time of the 
instant action, the appellant was age 54 and the respondent, 
age 40 (T -93). Both the appellant and respondent had 
been married before (T-6, 20). The appellant had the 
custody of a young girl, Jacklyn Peters, at the time of his 
marriage to respondent. The child had been taken in by 
appellant when she was small, but had not been adopted 
(T -6). Subsequent to the marriage between appellant and 
respondent, both parties adopted J acklyn Peters ( T -33). 
At the time of this action Miss Peters was 18 years old 
(R-59). 
Prior to the time of marriage, the parties entered into an 
antinuptial agreement ( R-16, etc.) Generally, the agree-
ment gave the appellant the home he then had, which was 
under option to purchase for $25,000.00, and provided that 
should he sell the property the respondent would waive all 
claims to the sale monies (R-16, etc.). Other properties 
the appellant brought into the marriage were to be disposed 
of in a varied manner. The terms of this disposition are not 
material to this appeal. 
At the time of marriage between the appellant and re-
spondent, the respondent was working and earning the sum 
of $270.00 per month, and was indebted in the sum of about 
$1,000.00 after a previous illness (T-9, 10, 74). The re-
spondent's only contribution to the marital property at 
marriage was a few items of furniture (T -9, 41). At the 
time of trial the respondent was employed at the same place 
as at the time of marriage and was earning $325.00 per 
month (T -10, 89). The respondent indicated this employ-
ment was temporary, but did not explain the basis for her 
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conclusion, although she had been employed for some time 
prior to the instant action (T-76, 89). No testimony was 
given indicating that at the time of suit the respondent was 
indebted, or otherwise had substantial obligations of any 
kind. Respondent did not testify to any "need" in excess of 
her present earning capacity or otherwise show an inability 
to provide for herself. 
The evidence disclosed at the time of marriage, subject 
to the antinuptial agreement, the appellant owned a home 
under option of sale for $25,000.00; $4,300.00 in cash on 
deposit; a boat; and an automobile and household furnish-
ings ( R-16, etc., T -8). At the time of the instant action, he 
was employed by a railroad where he had a gross income of 
$10,000.00 per year, and a net income of approximately 
$6,000.00 per year (T-44, 51). 
The appellant had prior to the instant action filed for 
divorce and obtained a default decree, which was there-
after set aside upon mutual agreement (T-8, 38, 78). At 
that time, February 1963, the respondent signed over to 
appellant all interest in their present home, which had been 
purchased with appellant's money and which the Court 
awarded appellant (R-37, 39, Exhibit 1, T-16, 22).1 
The appellant filed the instant action on October 28, 
1963 on the grounds of mental cruelty (R-2). The re-
spondent answered denying the cruelty and counterclaimed 
(with "amended" counterclaim) alleging mental and phys-
ical distress for one year "last past" (R-4, 11). The re-
spondent alleged facts and made argument in support of 
condonation, but the trial court made no finding of con-
donation (R-21). 
1 Contrary to the trial court's decree, the real property was not in joint 
names (R-22). 
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The evidence in support of the appellant's claim for 
relief disclosed that the respondent had indicated she 
wanted their daughter, J acklyn, to leave the house ( T -14). 
The n·spondent accused the appellant of having sexual re-
lations with their daughter and referred to her as a "whore" 
and "bastard kid" (T-15, 24, 28, 29). The respondent had 
no use for their daughter (T -42). She objected to the ap-
pellant supporting the daughter or spending money for her 
education (T -16, 18). The respondent criticized the ap-
pellant's activities and purchases such as his car, his eating 
and way of life (T -25, 26, 27). She called him "dirty" and 
disliked appellant's personal habits (T -26, 27). Further, 
the respondent had contacts with her former husband 
(T-20). The respondent's attitude towards the appellant 
was characterized as cool and indifferent (T -20, 24, 27) 
and there was little peace and harmony in the home 
(T -24) . Appellant testified respondent told him she didn't 
love him and urged him to get a divorce ( T -19) . 
The respondent contended the appellant had struck her 
on one occasion after the instant action was filed ( T -8 7 ) . 
That they argued over the appellant's property (T-76) 
and that appellant was indifferent to her personal needs 
and expenses (T -76). The respondent denied calling Jack-
lyn Peters a whore and claimed that the appellant had 
called respondent such a name (T-80). She further testi-
fied she had provided gifts and clothing for their adopted 
daughter ( T -81 ) . The respondent stated that she had con-
tributed some household items to the marriage. The ap-
pellant told respondent her son was unwelcome in the home 
after their marriage and as a result, he left ( T -90) . 
The appellant denied calling respondent names ( T -57) 
and denied hitting her ( T -4 7). No evidence that respond-
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ent ever suffered any mental anguish was shown, or that 
appellant caused any such anguish. 
The only independent evidence, apart for the parties 
themselves, was furnished by Jacklyn Peters, 18 years old, 
adopted daughter of the parties. 
Miss Peters testified that there had been discord and 
disharmony between the parties since May, 1963. She in-
dicated the respondent became upset when the appellant 
and she were together and that respondent accused Jacklyn 
of conspiring against her (T-60, 61). Jacklyn further 
stated that the respondent had accused her and appellant 
of "sleeping together" and wanting to live as husband and 
wife ( T -62) . Respondent also accused J acklyn of being 
independently promiscuous and objected to money spent on 
the child's education, arguing that the child could support 
herself (T-62, 65). Jacklyn indicated that originally the 
respondent's attitude towards her had been friendly, and 
that respondent had made her clothes and bought her some 
items (T-71). 
Based upon the above evidence, the trial court made the 
award of $2,500.00 lump sum in lieu of alimony to respond-
ent, and awarded her a divorce on her counterclaim. The 
appellant was awarded the real property that was in fact 
in his name. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RE-
SPONDENT A LUMP SUM IN LIEU OF ALIMONY. 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in awarding the 
respondent a lump sum in lieu of alimony of $2,500.00. In 
2 Although evidence of condonation was introduced, the Court ~ade ~o 
such finding against the appellant, but found he had failed to prove h1s claun 
(R-22). 
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~dson, Divorce and Annulment, 2 Ed.,§ 14.23, it is stated: 
"I(Pwt·ver, as a rule, although not always, a lump sun;t awar~ s.hould 
be made only in those instances where some special eqmties re-
quire it or make it advisable ... " 
In Stefanick v. Stefanick, 167 P.2d 848 (Mont., 1946), 
the ~[ontana Supreme Court recognized the general rule 
that ordinarily an award of a lump sum in lieu of alimony 
should be avoided. That case is similar to the instant one in 
that the parties were married only a relatively short time, 
and had prior to marriage entered into a prenuptial agree-
ment. The Court noted with reference to the policy of lump 
sum payments: 
"'This Court has held on several occasions that it is inadvisable, 
except for special reasons and under special circumstances, to 
make an award of alimony in gross or in a lump sum.'" 
The Court went on to reverse the trial court's determination 
in favor of a lump sum award and did so noting: 
"While the terms of an award of alimony or support to the wife are 
generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
such discretion must be supported, we think, by evidence as to the 
circumstances of the particular case. An award of a lump sum 
should be supported by some impelling reason for its necessity or 
desirability." 
It is submitted that the facts of the instant case demon-
strated no necessity or desirability for making the respond-
ent the award of a lump sum in lieu of alimony. The award 
of alimony is to be determined primarily, although not ex-
clusin·ly. on the needs of the wife and financial ability of 
the husband. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 2 Ed., 
~ 1·!.34. In Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 
( 1937), this Court noted that fault or cruelty has no place 
in making a property award. Consequently, the right of the 
respondent to alimony should be dependent upon her needs 
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and contribution to the property and accumulations of the 
parties. In Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176P.2d 144 
( 1946), the Utah court recognized that a lump sum ali-
mony award was not totally improper where there was 
some substantial reason for it, relying upon the Pinion case. 
In Pinion v. Pinion, supra, this court laid out the tests for 
settlements of property which are applicable to alimony. 
When the facts of the instant case are examined against 
the standards set out in Pinion, it is clear that no alimony 
should have been awarded. The court laid down the follow-
ing standards as determinative of proper awards: ( 1) The 
amount and kind of property owned by each of the parties; 
( 2) whether the property was acquired before coverture 
or accumulated jointly; ( 3) the opportunity and ability of 
each to earn money; ( 4) the financial condition and neces-
sities of the parties; ( 5 ) the health of the parties; ( 6) the 
standard of living of the parties; ( 7) the duration of the 
marriage; (8) the wife's economic status as a result of the 
marriage, and ( 9) the parties' age. In the instant case, all 
the economic assets of the marriage came from the appel-
lant and were accumulated prior to marriage. The appel-
lant contributed the home, car and what cash he had in the 
bank. The respondent contributed only a few items of furni-
ture and entered the marriage heavily in debt. Each were 
employed at the time of marriage and were employed at the 
time of the instant action. The respondent's income was 
better at divorce, being $325.00 per month against $270.00 
per month at marriage. At the time of divorce, respondent 
was apparently free from debt. No testimony was offered 
wherein she indicated any need for alimony or that her in-
come would not adequately meet her needs; nor was any 
evidence offered to demonstrate her needs. Respondent's 
health had apparently improved since marriage. There-
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spondent was 40 the appellant 54. Appellant had appar-
ently disposed of cash assets other than the proceeds of the 
home. Consequently, it cannot but be concluded that there 
was any basis for an award of alimony. 
In Foster, Family Law, 1962 Annual Survey of Ameri-
can Law, pp. 603,618, it is noted: 
"Unfortunately, it is impossible to report that there is any general 
trend in recent cases toward a more realistic attitude in support 
and alimony awards. On the one hand, employment opportunities 
or the earning potential of women are too often ignored, and, on 
thr other, courts typically adopt the policy that the wife is entitled 
to maintain that standard of living to which she became accus-
tomed during marriage and thus indirectly penalize the husband 
for his marital fault. It is not unusual for pseudo-punitive damages 
to become involved in the determination of the amount, even 
though it requires but little reflection to reach the conclusion that 
in matrimonial actions it is all but impossible to allocate fault 
with any assurance of accuracy." 
The need of courts to free themselves from award con-
cepts unrelated to modern society and needs cannot be 
overemphasized. In Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wash. 2d 639, 
369 P.2d 516 (1962), the Washington Supreme Court 
noted: 
"Alimony is not a matter of right. When the wife has the ability 
to earn a living, it is not the policy of the law of this state to give 
her a perpetual lien on her divorced husband's future income." 
By the same token, where the evidence is so overwhelm-
ing in demonstrating the lack of need for the instant award, 
this Court should not approve the decision of the trial court 
which in effect circumvents the parties antinuptial agree-
ments The award was contrary to law and reason and 
should be vacated by this Court . 
• 
3 ~o evidence was received to show that appellant had assets available to 
sathusfy ~e l~p sum award exclusive of the proceeds of Class I property under 
e antmupual agreement. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RE-
SPONDENT A DIVORCE FROM THE APPELLANT ON THE 
BASIS OF HER COUNTERCLAIM SINCE 
A. THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS CONTRARY TO 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; 
B. NO EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED BY RESPONDENT 
SHOWING THAT APPELLANT'S CONDUCT RE-
SULTED IN EXTREME MENTAL ANGUISH. 
A. The trial court ruled that the appellant had failed in 
his burden of proof and that the respondent was entitled to 
a decree of divorce on her counterclaim. It is submitted the 
trial court erred in failing to accord all the testimony the 
evidentiary weight to which it was entitled, and in deciding 
the case contrary to the only independent evidence cor-
roborating either party. 
The evidence favoring the respondent shows that there 
were arguments between the respondent and appellant over 
property. That according to the respondent, the appellant 
had on one occasion referred to her as a "whore" and a 
"gold digger." Respondent further testified that the appel-
lant had made her pay her own medical bills. Further, there 
was testimony that after filing the divorce on one instance, 
the appellant struck the respondent with his open hand. 
This was the extent of the respondent's evidence which was 
based on her testimony. No independent corroborative evi-
dence was offered to support the contentions. It is admitted 
that if no other evidence had been received that this would 
be sufficient under the law to allow the respondent a di-
vorce. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.2d 
923 ( 1962). However, in the instant case, the respondent's 
testimony was offered on counterclaim and was clearly less 
onerous than the testimony of the tribulations suffered by 
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the appellant because of respondent's conduct. In addition, 
apprllant denied the respondent's assertions. 
The testimony of the appellant was to the effect that 
the respondent accused him of illicit relations with their 
adopted daughter, called the child a whore and bastard 
and constantly resented her presence. The respondent dis-
liked the appellant assisting their daughter in her educa-
tion, and demanded the child support herself. The re-
spondent according to the appellant had shown him very 
little affection after he agreed to their previous decree being 
vacated. The respondent told the appellant she did not love 
him and told him to get a divorce. In addition, she had some 
association \vith her ex-husband. She nagged appellant and 
complained about his eating, personal habits and accused 
him of being a dirty old man. The course of conduct of the 
respondent had carried on for several months. 4 The totality 
of the appellant's evidence demonstrated a long period of 
cruel treatment by respondent far more severe than that 
offered in support of respondent's counterclaim. 
The only independent corroborative testimony came 
from the parties' adopted daughter, J acklyn. She sup-
ported the appellant's testimony. According to J acklyn, 
there had been substantial discord in the home generated 
by the respondent. The respondent accused J acklyn of 
sleeping with her father, of wanting to live with him, and of 
being generally promiscuous. Further, J acklyn corrobo-
rated her father's testimony that her mother resented her 
and resented money being spent on her for school. Thus, 
the ovenrhelming weight of testimony supported the ap-
pellant's claims. Under such circumstances, the divorce 
should have been granted to the appellant, or at least to 
sh 'C~mtrary to the Court's finding, it is submitted that the evidence does not 
ow IlllSconduct of the appellant over any sustained period. 
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both parties. Sartain v. Sartain, 389 P.2d 1023 (Utah 
1964). InHendricksv. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 256P.2d 
366 ( 1953), this Court commented: 
"In view of the fact that neither spouse is accused of the com-
mission of a felony, adultery5 or any other heinous offense but 
the reciprocal claims rest upon various acts and omissions alleged 
to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial court would best per-
form its function in the administration of justice by determining 
which party was least at fault, granting a divorce and adjusting 
their rights ... " (Emphasis Added) 
In Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 
( 1956) , the Court again recognized the rule that the di-
vorce should be granted the party least at fault. Although 
the Court therein indicated it would not overturn the award 
of the divorce for the wife, the case is distinguishable from 
the instant situation since: ( 1) the only independent evi-
dence supports the appellant, ( 2) the appellant's evidence 
when compared to the respondent's conclusively shows he 
was less at fault and that the respondent's misconduct was 
the more severe in time and quality. In Carlton v. Carlton, 
104 So. 2d 363 (Fla., 1958), the husband was awarded a 
divorce because of nagging, criticizing and kindred com· 
plaints by the wife. In Suffredini v. Suffredini, 138 A.2d 
710 (Conn., 1957), and Brandman v. Brandman, 138A.2d 
869 ( Pa., 1958) , divorces were granted to husbands be-
cause of false accusations of adultery and annoying tele-
phone calls by wives. These precedents support the award-
ing of the divorce to appellant in this case. 
B. Additionally, it is submitted the trial court erred in 
awarding the respondent the divorce since she offered no 
testimony that any of the conduct caused her mental an· 
5Although not alleged by complaint the respondent was alleged to have ac-
cused appellant of sexual relations with his daughter which would be adultery. 
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guish. In Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.2d 
923 ( 1962), this Court stated: 
"To establish mental cruelty, plaintiff must prove that her hus-
band's cruel treatment caused her to suffer great mental distress." 
Further, the mental anguish must be proved by substan-
tial and satisfactory evidence. Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 
580, 245 Pac. 335 ( 1926). In this case, although respond-
ent related various events and occurrences, she did not indi-
cate or demonstrate that as a result she was caused to suffer 
great mental anguish. Consequently, the divorce was not 
properly awarded to her. Hyrup v. Hyrup, supra. 
It is submitted that this Court should reverse the trial 
court's decree and order the divorce awarded to the ap-
pellant. POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY 
.\~D ATTORNEY'S FEES PENDING APPEAL SINCE THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION. 
Subsequent to the notice of appeal having been filed, the 
respondent petitioned the trial court and received an award 
of temporary alimony and attorney's fees on appeal. It is 
submitted that this order of the trial court is void because 
the trial court no longer had jurisdiction. Once the notice 
of appeal was filed jurisdiction over the case vested in the 
Supreme Court, subject only to whatever residual jurisdic-
tion the Rules of Civil Procedure allow the District Courts. 
Rule 73 (a) (b), U.R.C.P. The rules do not provide that 
orders during appeal, governing the conduct of the parties, 
are to be made by the District Court. The District Court 
was therefore without jurisdiction to award temporary ali-
mony or attorney's fees after the appeal had been filed. Rule 
73(a), U.R.C.P. cf., Rule 73 (g). The petition should have 
been directed to the Supreme Court. This Court could, if it 
desired, have referred the matter to the District Court for 
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evidentiary findings, this then would have conferred juris-
diction on the District Court to that limited extent. Prece-
dent supports the jurisdiction of this Court alone to award 
alimony and costs pending appeal. Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 128 
( 1874); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564,65 P.2d 642 
( 1937) ; Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 
( 1948); 136 A.L.R. 502; Nelson, Divorce & Annulment, 
§ 12.49. 
Since no appeal or petition from the respondent has been 
addressed to this Court, Cast v. Cast, supra, no award could 
be made nor is there any demonstrated need before this 
Court for such relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case demonstrates the unfortunate 
attitude of courts to treat divorce cases in an off-hand man-
ner. This is supported by the many obvious conflicts be-
tween the findings and the evidence. It is clear that no basis 
for any alimony or lump sum in lieu thereof was presented 
to the trial court sufficient to sustain the decree. Addi-
tionally, it is manifest that the weight of evidence required 
the appellant be awarded the divorce. He was least at fault, 
presented a more compelling case and sustained his burden 
by independent corroboration. The Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
AND 
CLAYTON & GOULD 
First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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